Tapping Transaction Costs to Forecast Acquisition Cost Breaches by Armey, Laura E. & Angelis, Diana I.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications Collection
2016-01
Tapping Transaction Costs to Forecast
Acquisition Cost Breaches
Armey, Laura E.
Defense ARJ, January 2016, Vol. 23 No. 1 : 56–76
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/50290





Laura E. Armey and Diana I. Angelis
This article uses transaction costs to predict the probability of incurring a 
cost breach in a major defense acquisition program (MDAP). As transaction 
costs are not explicitly measured for MDAPs, the authors use estimates of 
systems engineering and program management (SE/PM) costs as a share 
of overall program costs as a proxy for transaction costs. Using survival 
analysis, a new approach to predicting cost breaches, they also found that 
an increased share of SE/PM costs in initial program estimates can help 
predict future cost breaches.  
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Controlling cost growth for a major defense acquisition program 
(MDAP) has been problematic in the Department of Defense (DoD) 
for many years. A 2007 RAND study of cost growth in DoD weapon 
systems determined that the cost of the 46 programs studied was 
more than 1.46 times the cost estimate for Milestone B (program 
initiation) (Younossi et al., 2007). According to the Government 
Accountability Office, active MDAPs in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 
collectively experienced a cost growth of $74.4 billion (Sullivan, 
2011). 
The Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) was introduced 
in 1967 to provide DoD and the Congress a summary 
of each MDAP’s ability to meet cost, perfor-
mance, and schedule objectives agreed upon 
by the program manager and defense acqui-
sition executive. Program managers were 
now required to provide a brief explanation 
in the SAR of how and why any cost breaches 
occurred. 
Based on evidence that this was insufficient to 
control cost growth, in 1982 Senator Samuel 
Nunn and Congressman David McCurdy 
introduced the Nunn-McCurdy Act (1983) to 
hold DoD accountable to Congress for man-
agement of program costs. The Nunn-McCurdy 
Act became law with the FY 1983 Department 
of Defense Authorization Act, establishing congressio-
nal oversight for MDAPs that exceed established cost 
thresholds. The Nunn-McCurdy Act has been statuto-
rily amended a number of times over the years. One of 
the most significant changes to the reporting require-
ments occurred in the FY 2006 National Defense 
Authorization Act (Pub. L. 109-163), when Congress 
added the original baseline estimate as a threshold 
against which to measure cost growth (National 
Defense, 2006). The new standard prevents DoD 
from avoiding a Nunn-McCurdy breach by 
simply rebaselining a program.
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Clearly, the ability to anticipate cost overruns before breaches occur would 
be extremely valuable to program managers and policy makers. However, 
the conventional focus on MDAP production costs potentially misses a 
critical clue. Angelis, Dillard, Franck, and Melese (2008) hypothesize that 
the higher the ratio of another key set of costs, transaction costs (costs 
associated with “source selection,… contract negotiation and management, 
performance measuring and monitoring, and dispute resolutions”) relative 
to production costs, the greater the likelihood of schedule and cost overruns. 
Higher transaction costs are typically experienced in programs that involve 
greater asset specificity, complexity, and imperfect and asymmetric infor-
mation—in other words, programs that are at greater risk (Franck & Melese, 
2008). Proxy measures first suggested by Angelis et al. (2008) that can be 
used to capture many of these costs include systems engineering and pro-
gram management (SE/PM) costs regularly reported by MDAP contractors. 
It seems reasonable to assume that combined SE/PM costs will be a higher 
share of total overall estimated costs (production + transaction costs, as 
predicted at the Milestone B decision point). Program managers, therefore, 
could reasonably anticipate higher costs in coping with more complex and 
riskier MDAP projects. Unclear is whether or not these costs are explicitly 
considered in program cost estimates or simply reflected in the size of SE/
PM staff assigned to more complex or high-risk programs.
Background
Many studies (e.g., Bolten, Leonard, Arena, Younossi, & Sollinger, 2008) 
have examined cost growth in DoD programs, yet little research has been 
done on the relationship between transaction costs and cost overruns as 
suggested by Angelis et al. in 2008. A 2006 RAND study established that 
MDAP SE/PM costs vary between programs depending on the program type 
(Stem, Boito, & Younossi, 2006), and Angelis et al. (2008) suggested using 
the SE/PM cost as a proxy for transaction costs to examine the relationship 
between transaction costs and cost overruns. 
In general, a program has two types of costs: production costs and transac-
tion costs. Production costs are usually captured in the Work Breakdown 
Structure (WBS), but transaction costs may not be adequately captured in 
the WBS. Because traditional cost estimates are based on the production 
costs found in the WBS, they do not explicitly include transaction costs 
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(Angelis et al., 2008). Although they are not often captured in the account-
ing records, the time and effort associated with complex and risky MDAP 
transactions represent real costs to the organization. 
In previous research, Angelis et al. (2008) examined how transaction costs 
might be captured in the cost estimates of DoD acquisition programs. 
Angelis et al. identified a number of issues with DoD program management 
cost data reported for major weapon systems and found that they are not 
well suited for developing a cost model that includes transaction cost vari-
ables. As an alternate approach, they explored using contractor Program 
Management data from cost data summary reports (DD Form 1921) and 
suggested using the SE/PM category as a proxy for transaction costs. The 
DoD (2011a) defines systems engineering as “the technical and management 
efforts of directing and controlling a totally integrated engineering effort 
of a system or program.” Program management is defined as “the business 
and administrative planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, con-
trolling, and approval actions designated to accomplish overall program 
objectives, which are not associated with specific hardware elements and 
are not included in Systems Engineering” (DoD, 2011, p. 222). The ratio of 
(SE + PM) costs relative to total program costs offers a potentially valuable 
way to compare transaction costs across different programs.
 Following the method used by Biggs (2013), this study uses the SEPM cost 
ratio for a program as shown in Equation 1: 
(1)
SE + PM Costs
Total Cost
SE/PM Cost Ratio = 
The numerator of the SE/PM cost ratio is the sum of SE and PM cost expen-
ditures and the denominator is total program expenditures (estimate at 
completion, or EAC). A ratio is calculated to provide a perspective on the rel-
ative magnitude of SE/PM expenditures as well as to allow for comparison 
across different programs. The hypothesis is that programs with higher SE/
PM cost ratios are more likely to experience cost breaches than programs 
with lower SE/PM cost ratios. This is based on the assumption that higher 
SE/PM cost ratios are related to riskier contractual relationships since 
more time, effort, and resources are expended to meet performance and 
schedule deadlines when compared to less risky contracts. To the extent that 
this is predicted early in the program, it could be useful to policy makers by 
providing an early warning that programs are more likely to result in cost 
and/or schedule overruns. 
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Biggs (2013) introduced the influence diagram in Figure 1, which describes 
the interactions between factors that may be associated with the occurrence 
of a cost breach. The dashed lines in Figure 1 represent factors that must 
be dealt with qualitatively or by using proxies. The solid lines represent 
factors that can be quantitatively evaluated. While the risk and complexity 
of a program may directly contribute to a cost overrun, the SE/PM efforts 
and the contract type can influence the magnitude and frequency of cost 
overruns as measured by cost breaches. 
FIGURE 1. COST BREACH INFLUENCE DIAGRAM
“Maturity” Transaction Costs SE/PM Cost Ratio





Figure 1 indicates that the risk and complexity of the MDAP will guide pro-
gram managers and contractors in their selection of an appropriate contract 
type, which in turn can influence the government’s exposure to cost over-
runs. In all likelihood, the risk and complexity of a program will drive the 
level of monitoring and negotiation (transaction costs) required to manage 
the program, and riskier, more complex programs will require higher levels 
of transaction costs. Specifically, we do not expect that transaction costs 
themselves drive overruns, but rather that the risk and complexity that 
require higher levels of transaction costs drive breaches. 
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Cost Breaches
In this article, we will examine how the SE/PM ratio and contract type 
are related to the probability of incurring a cost breach. Cost breaches occur 
when the amount of the cost overrun exceeds certain parameters defined 
by regulation. Within the defense acquisition community, programs may 
incur two types of cost breaches: Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) and 
Nunn-McCurdy breaches. For a program to incur an APB breach, estimated 
program expenditures must be greater than the APB EAC by at least 10 
percent. If the difference is 15 percent or more, a Nunn-McCurdy breach is 
incurred. Cost breaches frequently are incurred in six categories of appro-
priations: average procurement unit cost (APUC); program acquisition unit 
cost (PAUC); procurement; research, development, test and evaluation 
(RDT&E); military construction (MILCON); and acquisition-related oper-
ations and maintenance (O&M). Each of these cost breaches was included 
in the data set for this study. 
A formal cost estimate for a program is normally developed at Milestone 
B, the initiation of an acquisition program, when the APB is established. 
The APB is used for tracking and reporting cost and schedule for the life 
of the program, and it includes threshold and objective values for cost, 
schedule, and performance. A cost threshold breach is incurred when cost 
expenditures exceed the cost objective by 10 percent or more (DoD, 2013). 
If an MDAP has been officially rebaselined,1 cost breaches are measured 
to the current baseline. 
Nunn-McCurdy cost threshold breaches are based on original cost esti-
mates for PAUC and APUC at project completion. In the case of a program 
that has rebaselined, cost threshold breaches are also based on the current 
(i.e., rebaselined) cost estimate for PAUC and APUC at project completion. 
For purposes of this study, a cost breach is any reported in the SAR that is 
greater than or equal to 10 percent above the APB. The type of cost thresh-
old breach and the APB baseline against which it is compared are shown 
in Table 1. 
Within the defense acquisition community, 
programs may incur two types of cost breaches: 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) and Nunn-
McCurdy breaches. 
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Estimate 10% +15% +25%
Original Baseline 
Estimate N/A +30% +50%
Source: DoD, 2013
Figure 2 can be used to illustrate cost overrun calculations. The budgeted 
cost of work performed (BCWP) represents the total amount budgeted for 
work packages that are open or completed at any given point in time. The 
budgeted cost of work scheduled (BCWS) represents the total amount 
budgeted for the work that was scheduled for completion at a given point in 
time. The actual cost of work performed (ACWP) is the sum of actual costs 
incurred to accomplish the work performed at a given point in time.




















Source: DAU Gold Card, 2015
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The EAC is the sum of the ACWP and the estimate to 
completion (ETC) for the remaining work. The ETC 
can be calculated using the cost performance index 
(CPI) and the schedule performance index (SPI). The 
formula for calculating ETC is:
 ETC = (BAC – BCWP) / (CPI * SPI) (2)
When the EAC, a cost estimate for the total cost of 
the contract, is higher than the BAC, the baseline 
cost estimate of the contract, a cost overrun is pro-
jected. Nunn-McCurdy breaches are far rarer, perhaps 
because of the political threat or simply the higher 
threshold; thus, this article will include analysis of the 
potential of both types of cost overruns.
Data
This study used data originally collected by Biggs 
(2013) from two different data sources: SARs and the 
Cost and Software Data Reporting (CSDR) System. 
The SAR contains details of critical parameters of an 
MDAP, including threshold breaches, schedule, per-
formance, current contracts, and cost details. MDAPs 
typically require several contracts to be executed, 
often concurrently. SARs provide information for the 
overall program and not for individual contracts. A 
SAR may list a single contract or many contracts for a 
single MDAP. Because threshold breaches are associated with contract esti-
mates, only MDAPs that listed one contract in the “Contracts” section of the 
SAR were selected for purposes of this study. In addition to cost threshold 
breaches, the SAR indicates the time since program initiation at Milestone 
B, which was used in this study to indicate program maturity. 
The program cost data found in the DD Form 1921 CDSR provided by 
the Defense Cost and Resource Center in the Defense Automated Cost 
Information Management System database contain significantly more 
contract detail than the SARs. The WBS format of the CDSR facilitates 
obtaining information on SE/PM costs. To simplify the data collection 
process, only the cost data provided by the prime contractor were recorded 
for further analysis. The SE/PM cost values used in this study are extracted 
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from the WBS line item values for “EAC SE/PM cost,” which are listed on 
the CDSR (DD Form 1921). The EAC SE/PM cost is the projected SE/PM 
cost at contract completion. The SE/PM costs are inclusive of the total 
contract costs less the contractor’s profit/loss or fees.
The SE/PM category reported by the contractor has some limitations. First, 
the activities included in this category will vary somewhat from contractor 
to contractor. As a result, a small portion of the differences in SE/PM costs 
between contracts may be due to differences between the accounting sys-
tems used by each contractor. The general category, however, is a reasonable 
measure of the cost of activities commonly associated with SE/PM. Second, 
the costs included in SE/PM for a single contract may vary over time as new 
costs are defined by the contractor as being related to SE/PM. This could 
explain a small portion of the increase in the SE/PM cost in some contracts, 
but we did not observe significant differences in our data. Finally, we rec-
ognize that the SE/PM category does not capture all possible transaction 
costs nor was it ever intended to. Rather, it is likely that many if not most 
of the activities in this category are related to transactions, as opposed to 
production, and thus provide a reasonable measure of transaction costs.
This article will analyze the SE/PM-to-total-cost ratios of MDAPs, looking 
for a potential correlation between these ratios and the probability of expe-
riencing a cost breach. Determining the nature of any potential relationship 
between the SE/PM-to-cost ratio and the probability of cost breaches expe-
rienced by a program will test the hypothesis that programs with higher SE/
PM cost ratios will experience cost overruns more frequently than programs 
with lower SE/PM cost ratios. More formally, we will test the experimental 
hypothesis H1 that the probability of breach is increased by an increase in 
EAC SE/PM in the total cost:
H1: d(Probability Cost Breach) / d(EAC SEPM/Total cost) > 0
H0: d(Probability Cost Breach) / d(EAC SEPM/Total cost) = 0
The type of contract used for the program was also obtained from the 
CDSRs. Programs were noted as having either firm-fixed-price type con-
tracts or cost-plus type contracts. The type of contract used for a program is 
an indication of the perceived level of risk associated with execution of the 
contract. As the level of performance risk increases, the risk of cost overruns 
also increases and the amount of cost risk that the contractor is willing 
to assume tends to decrease. Contract types differ in how the cost risk is 
shared between the government and the contractor. In a firm-fixed-price 
contract, no cost sharing exists between the government and the contractor, 
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and the contractor has full responsibility for the performance costs and 
resulting profit (or loss). In a cost-plus contract, a share ratio based on the 
contract cost and the contractor’s fee (profit) is negotiated so that the con-
tractor has a predetermined responsibility for the performance costs, which 
will directly affect the fee (profit) (U.S. General Services Administration, 
2005). By including contract type in our analysis, we can account for basic 
risk differences recognized by both the government and the contractor at 
the outset of the program. Programs with aspects of both were treated as 
cost-plus type contracts since cost-plus contracts are a better indicator of 
program risk. 
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Breach— 
Program Av. 
32 0.8125 1.090649 0 4
Nunn-
McCurdy
32 0.28123 0.5226715 0 2
Program 
Type













30 16.59583 13.81136 1.4 54.66667
Table 2 describes the data used in our study. The study covers 32 programs 
over 84 program years. Despite not having greatly disparate thresholds, our 
sample reflected far more APB breaches—26 program years—versus only 9 
program years for Nunn-McCurdy breaches. Approximately half of the pro-
grams were firm-fixed-price and half were cost-plus type contracts. We also 
compared three different measures of the SE/PM ratio. The first measure is 
for the EAC of the SE/PM ratio to total costs, as estimated at Milestone B. 
SE/PM are on average about 13 percent of total costs estimated at Milestone 
B. Programs that rebaseline would update this measure, but for purposes 
of this study we maintain the original prebreach measure because we are 
interested in the predictability of breaches based on original assessments of 
risk. The second measure is still the EAC, but programs update this measure 
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as they go along. This number is about 1.5 percentage points higher than 
the Milestone B estimate or 14.7 percent of total costs. We also include the 
actual to date SE/PM to total cost at each point in time for our sample. At 
16.6 percent of total costs, this is even higher than either predicted share, 
indicating that estimates are on average overoptimistic and that SE/PM 
costs grow, on average, faster than total costs.  
Analysis of the data shows that more than half of the MDAPs in the study 
initially estimated an EAC SE/PM cost ratio of 0.10 or less and experienced 
fewer than two cost breaches since 1998. Furthermore, it can be inferred 
that most of the programs have experienced at least one cost breach, which 
seems to confirm a RAND report finding that most MDAPs’ actual costs 
exceeded baseline cost estimates (Arena, Leonard, Murray, & Younossi, 
2006).2 Observations of the MDAP SE/PM-to-total-cost ratios agree with 
the RAND study, suggesting that trends in SE/PM costs vary across MDAPs 
(Stem et al., 2006). Recall that SE/PM costs are used as proxy measures of 
the transaction costs required to administer and manage the MDAP.
Methodology
Because our data set includes programs that have not experienced cost 
breaches over the time period studied, our data are considered to be “right 
censored.” This means that ordinary linear regression is not a good option 
for analyzing the data. Instead, we employ survival analysis to test whether 
relatively high Milestone B EAC SE/PM is a predictor of cost breaches. 
Survival analysis is typically used in medicine and social sciences to exam-
ine when an event of interest will occur. For example, in medicine where the 
event of interest is a heart attack, we can use survival analysis to predict 
whether a patient will suffer a heart attack within a period of time. In this 
study, the event of interest is a cost breach, and we are interested in whether 
a program will experience a cost breach. 
In our medical example, we could use survival analysis to identify risk fac-
tors, such as obesity, that might indicate a greater propensity for suffering a 
heart attack. In this study, we are looking for risk factors that might predict 
cost breaches. Two explanatory variables were included in the analysis: 
EAC SE/PM cost ratio and program contract type (fixed-price or cost-plus). 
While the exact nature of the relationship between cost threshold breaches 
and these explanatory variables is unknown, it is reasonable to presuppose 
that the explanatory variables influence the cost performance of the MDAPs 
as shown in Figure 1.   
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Using survival analysis, we construct a hazard function for cost breaches. 
A hazard function shows (over time) the probability that an event (such as 
a cost breach) will be incurred. As programs can experience multiple 
cost breaches despite rebaselining, we allow for multiple breaches 
over time3 and estimate how the hazard of cost breach varies 
with our explanatory variables. Hazard models are also useful 
because they are more tolerant of gaps and censoring. Hazard 
models can be thought of as conditional logits (Cleves et al., 
2010). We allow for repeat failures over the period—that 
is, following cost breaches, we allow a program to stay in 
the sample. 
Survival analysis uses time-at-risk as its relevant time 
metric. Thus, we measure “survival time” in terms of the 
maturity of the design and technology of the system. In this 
study, program maturity is measured by the time elapsed 
since Milestone B, the entry point into the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development phase. For a program to receive 
approval to begin Milestone B in DoD, the design and technol-
ogy associated with the system must be considered “mature.”4  
In this analysis, we use the Cox-Relative Hazard. It is con-
sidered semiparametric because it does not imply a specific 
functional form on the hazard of breaches over time. The 
proportional hazard model is specified as:
hj (t) = h0 (t) exp (xj  βx)
which states that the hazard a particular subject j faces at 
time t is a function of the baseline hazard modified propor-
tionally by the vector of regression coefficients βx. The Cox 
model does not estimate the baseline hazard. We can convert 
coefficients from these regressions to cumulative hazard ratios 
to understand the marginal effect on the baseline hazard of a change 
in the coefficient. This is done simply by calculating the exponent of the 
coefficient and using it as a multiplier (e.g., the value 0.9 would correspond 
with a 10 percent reduction, and 1.1 would be a 10 percent increase). While 
we report coefficients, we interpret our results using exponentiated hazard 
ratios—that is, the cumulative hazard of a cost breach.
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We next examine whether baseline SE/PM-to-cost ratios inf luence the 
probability of a Nunn-McCurdy breach using a similar analysis. While the 
difference between the two is mainly the 10 percent versus 15 percent 
threshold, Nunn-McCurdy breaches are sufficiently rare that they 
may have significantly different causes.  
Finally, we test the robustness of our finding using logit mod-
els. Logit is commonly used to determine the influence of 
exogenous variables on the probability of a dichotomous 
outcome, such as whether or not a cost breach occurs in any 
given program year.  Logit is preferred over a linear regres-
sion model because, using a logistic function, it constrains 
all probability-of-occurrence estimates to be between 0 





Where xβ is a function of the vector of explanatory variables. 
We are curious as to whether Milestone B SE/PM predictions 
are the best predictors of breaches or whether within-program 
changes in SE/PM estimates or actuals should cause concern 
about program health.  To test, we use a simple logit model, 
which predicts the probability of failure on the baseline 
EAC SE/PM ratios as in our hazard model. We cluster the 
standard errors by program.  We use a fixed effects (con-
ditional) logit to model whether a change in either EAC or 
the actual SE/PM cost ratio for an MDAP will change its 
probability of breaching a cost threshold. Formally, this 
model measures the impact of deviations by the independent 
variable from the program’s mean (Allison, 2001). 
Results
We find that higher estimated SE/PM ratios are associated with a higher 
risk of APB breaches. Figures 3 and 4 show the cumulative risk of APB and 
Nunn-McCurdy breaches over program maturity. Table 3 shows the results 
for Hazard models for APB breaches, and Table 4 shows the results for 
Nunn-McCurdy breaches
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TABLE 3. APB BREACH HAZARD
Variables (1) (2)
EAC SE/PM from 0.0482*** 0.0284*




Note. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In the first model a 1 percentage point increase in the estimated SE/PM 
ratio at completion increases the risk of breach by 5 percent, a result that is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. When contract type is added 
as a control, the impact of the SE/PM ratio goes down to 3 percent and its 
significance is reduced to the 10 percent level.  Looking at the impact of 
contract type, we find that having a cost-plus type contract multiplies the 
risk of an APB breach by 3.1, which is significant at the 5 percent level.
TABLE 4. NUNN-MCCURDY BREACH HAZARD
Variables (3) (4)
EAC SE/PM from 0.0247 0.00352




Note. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Nunn-McCurdy breaches are significantly less common than APB breaches 
and SE/PM ratios or contract type do not appear to determine them. The 
SE/PM ratio is not a significant predictor of Nunn-McCurdy breaches, and 
while type has a similar magnitude to its impact on APB breaches, it is not 
statistically significant either.  
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Baseline EAC SE/PM 0.0433*
(0.0244)






Observations 84 36 39
Number of programs  10 11
Table 5 shows the results of logit analysis for APB breaches. We find that 
the likelihood of a cost breach is related to the EAC SE/PM ratio predicted 
at milestone B, but not to changes in the predicted ratio or to the actual SE/
PM ratio. The marginal effect of the logit model is very similar to the hazard 
function and statistically significant at the 10 percent level: for every 1 per-
cent increase or decrease in the EAC SE/PM cost ratio, there is an increase 
or decrease of 4 percent in the probability of a program sustaining a cost 
threshold breach. We do not find any within-program impact using fixed 
effects logit models, indicating that a change in the EAC SE/PM ratio is not 
an indicator of a potential breach. Thus forecasts of cost breaches should 
focus on initial SE/PM ratio estimates. 
Conclusion
This article successfully tested the hypothesis that transaction costs could 
help explain future cost breaches of MDAPs. Using SE/PM costs as a ratio of 
total program costs, we find the greater this ratio is at the outset (Milestone 
B estimate), the greater the risk of eventual cost breaches. This information 
reflects the program manager’s implicit assessment of the risk of a program 
and can be a valuable early indicator of which programs will benefit from 
greater oversight. We should be careful to note that high SE/PM ratios may 
be the result of program managers responding proactively to program risks. 
As such, we are not suggesting that high SE/PM ratios are a bad thing—simply 
that they can be used to predict cost breaches, which often occur in high-risk, 
more complex programs. This suggests that the SE/PM ratio is a measurable 
indicator of cost risk and anticipated transaction costs.
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This article also offers an innovative way of looking at cost breaches, using sur-
vival analysis to forecast cost breaches in MDAPs over a program’s life cycle. 
We offer somewhat robust analysis, using a more traditional logit analysis, of 
our predictions. We believe this is a step forward in using measures available 
in DoD’s vast databases of cost information to develop more robust forecasts 
of potential cost overrun risks in programs. These findings suggest that the 
department could benefit from capturing more explicit measures of transac-
tion costs to determine more precisely their role in predicting cost variability. 
Appendix
PROGRAMS SELECTED FOR STUDY
Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar
AIM-9X/Short Range Air-to-Air Missile
AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM)
Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System (AMF JTRS)
AN/WQR-3, Advanced Deployable System (ADS)
Apache Block IIIA Remanufacture (AB3A REMANUFACTURE)
AV-8B/Attack, V/STOL, Close Air Support (Harrier II+ Remanufacture)
B-2 Radar Modernization Program
Cobra Judy Replacement (Cobra Judy Replacement)
EA-18G Growler (EA-18G)
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
E-3 AWACS Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP)
E-2C Reproduction
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T)
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV)
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System/DPICM/Unitary/Alternative Warhead 
(GMLRS/GMLRS AW)
Joint Common Missile (JCM)
Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (formerly Cluster 1) (JTRS GMR)
Longbow Hellfire - subsystem of the AH-64 Apache Weapon System
LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship
MQ-4C Unmanned Aircraft System Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (MQ-4C 
UAS BAMS)
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP)
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)
Presidential Helicopter Replacement (VH-71) Program
P-8A Poseidon
Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM)
Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB II)
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program
Standard Missile (SM) - 2 Block IV
Stryker Family of Vehicles (STRYKER)
UH-72A Light Utility Helicopter (LUH)
Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T)
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Endnotes
1 Circumstances authorizing changes to the baseline are limited; revisions to the 
current APB are not authorized unless there is a significant change in program 
parameters and must be approved by the Milestone Decision Authority (DoD, 2013).
2 For most of the programs reviewed, actual costs exceeded the baseline cost 
estimate established at Milestone B (program initiation), as measured by the cost 
growth factor (Arena et al., 2006).
3 For robustness, we also ran the analysis without allowing for multiple breaches, and 
while the results were weaker, they were still statistically significant and of a similar 
magnitude. Still, the fact that including multiple breaches strengthens our results, 
indicates that programs with high levels of complexity and risk often suffer for these 
high levels repeatedly.
4 Milestone B approval authorizes an MDAP to enter the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development phase of the acquisition process. Statutory requirements 
for MDAPs to achieve Milestone B approval are found in Title 10 U.S.C. § 2366b. 
These requirements stipulate that the program be certified by the Milestone Decision 
Authority to be affordable, fully funded through the Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP), and that the cost and schedule estimates are reasonable.
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